Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
ECON Publications

Department of Economics

1997

Does A Food Exemption Lead to A Higher State Sales Tax Rate?
Roy W. Bahl
Georgia State University, rbahl@gsu.edu

Richard R. Hawkins

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_facpub
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Bahl, Roy, and Richard R. Hawkins. “Does A Food Exemption Lead to A Higher State Sales Tax Rate?”
Proceedings. Annual Conference on Taxation and Minutes of The Annual Meeting of The National Tax
Association, Vol. 90, 1997, Pp. 447–54. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41954565

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Economics at ScholarWorks @
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in ECON Publications by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.

National Tax Association

DOES A FOOD EXEMPTION LEAD TO A HIGHER STATE SALES TAX RATE?
Author(s): Roy Bahl and Richard R. Hawkins
Source: Proceedings. Annual Conference on Taxation and Minutes of the Annual Meeting of
the National Tax Association, Vol. 90 (1997), pp. 447-454
Published by: National Tax Association
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41954565
Accessed: 19-10-2022 20:47 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

National Tax Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access
to Proceedings. Annual Conference on Taxation and Minutes of the Annual Meeting of
the National Tax Association

This content downloaded from 131.96.28.155 on Wed, 19 Oct 2022 20:47:49 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

DOES A FOOD EXEMPTION LEAD TO A HIGHER STATE SALES TAX RATE?

Roy Bahl
Policy Research Center, Georgia State University
Richard R. Hawkins

College of Business, University of West Florida

T HE FOOD-FOR-HOME CONSUMPTION EXEMPTION FROM
choice is generally between lowering a tax rate and

narrowing
a tax base. Traditional economic theory
state sales taxes is a political winner: The tax
on
advocates
reducing the overall tax rate, thereby
food is widely perceived as being regressive;
all
reducing
the excess burden.1 Other arguments supincreased costs of exempting food are argued
to
porting
be negligible; and the exemption provides tax
re- an overall rate reduction include a reduction in the rewards for tax evasion and relatively
lief to nearly every voter. Food purchases are given
preferential tax treatment in 29 states and thelower
Dis- administrative and compliance costs.
Traditional economic theory, however, is not
trict of Columbia, and an exemption has been proposed recently in a number of other states. always convincing. Most state taxes give sizable
tax preferences. For example, homestead exempMost tax policy analysts see the food exemptions, special income tax exemptions for senior
tion as bad public policy that will impose addicitizens, and sales tax exemptions for food, utilitional compliance costs and not necessarily reduce
ties,
the regressivity of the sales tax. Further, the
ex-and services are common, and these exempemption will increase existing horizontal inequitions all lead to both horizontal inequities and
excess burdens.
ties, and can confuse intergovernmental fiscal
relations within a state and increase the revenue
When state policymakers choose to narrow the
sales tax base with respect to food, this policy ap-

sensitivity to the business cycle.

pears to be irreversible (Due and Mikesell, 1994).2
Who is right? Is the sales tax exemption on food

Only North Carolina and Louisiana have ever repurchases for home consumption sound? Should
versed a food preference in the state sales tax. But
it continue? Our work suggests that the harm
in both of these states, grocery purchases enjoy a
caused by the food exemption may be exacerbated
when a state increases the sales tax rate to make
limited tax advantage today.3 One reason for the
irreversibility of the food exemption may be the
up for the lost revenue. This policy substitution
increases the excess burden of the sales tax, same
in- reason why policymakers ever reduce a tax
creases the rewards to tax evasion, offsets anybase:
im- proponents often argue exemptions on equity grounds or, sometimes, less formal concepts
provement in vertical equity, and further increases
"fairness." An example of the latter, according
administrative and compliance costs. Whenof
Due
to Due and Fairchild (1988), occurred in Nebraska
and Mikesell (1994) wrote, "In summary, food
when legislators argued that a tax on food was "imexemption is perhaps the largest mistake the states

moral." Critics of tax exemptions (e.g., Epstein,
have made in their sales tax structures . . . they
1993) point to public choice models of government
may have underestimated the severity of the mis-

decisionmaking where lobbying is the basis for
take by not considering rate increases. The empiri-

preferential tax treatment. Obviously, if
cal evidence on the relationship between food
are convinced that a tax is immoral
exemptions and sales tax rates is the subject of policymakers
this
or if the lobby effort against restoring the tax is
strong, an exemption will remain in place.
From the work of Fox and Campbell (1984), Dye

paper.

WHY AN EXEMPTION MIGHT LEAD

and McGuire (1991), Hawkins (1997a), and Bahl
and Hawkins (1997), collections from food pur-

TO A HIGHER RATE

During a budgetary surplus, state policymakers

chases for home consumption are a stabilizing force

can increase reserve accounts, increase expendi- in total sales tax revenue. Therefore, when
tures, or reduce revenue. The revenue reduction policymakers exempt food, they should expect a
447
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household only if the household does not

more cyclical sales tax. This combination, an irreversible food exemption and a surprising revenue
response to the business cycle, is a potential cause
for a state sales tax rate increase following a new
food exemption.

qualify, does not participate, or spends more

than the food stamp allocation. While eligibility, participation and spending vary across

even the low-income groups, Bahl and
Hawkins find a dramatically different dis-

tributional impact for a food exemption

FOOD AND SALES TAX REGRESSIVITY

when most poor households use food

stamps.
According to Due and Mikesell (1994), sales tax
regressivity has been the loudest argument in the(3) The absence of behavioral responses to sales
debate over exempting food. This argument is based

taxation is implied. First, most sales tax

on a decline in the relative size of the food budget

analysis assumes that consumers bear the en-

as income increases (Table 1). With this decline,
one would expect a food exemption to provide a

tire burden of the sales tax (an exception can

disproportionate benefit to low-income households.

portion of the food-exemption relief may fall

Four important assumptions were made in the con-

on suppliers. Second, the price elasticity of
demand may vary across income classes. In

be found in Cline and Wilson (1995), but a

clusion that a food exemption provides necessary
relief for poorer households:

this case, high-income households could
make larger adjustments to purchases, increasing their tax relief by eating at home

(1) Income is assumed to be the appropriate
measure of a household's well-being. This

more often (and reducing their tax liability

assumption has been questioned over the past

on restaurant meals) while low-income

couple of years. Arguments for total expenditures (instead of income) can be found in

households were eating at home. This varia-

Poterba (1989 and 1991) and Metcalf (1994).

tion in behavior is considered by Hawkins
(1997b) and could reduce the efficiency of

Using household expenditures as a proxy for

a food exemption tax cut intended to benefit

long-run household income, one can ques-

or low-income households.

tion the conclusion that a sales tax is regressive and whether a food preference benefits

(4) If the general sales tax rate does not remain
constant, the benefits toward the low-income

low-income households.

(2) It is assumed that poorer households do not
receive food stamps. States are required by
federal law to exempt food stamp purchases
from the general sales tax, and a new food

households in Table 1 can be misleading.
Bahl and Hawkins consider the joint tax
policy of a food exemption and an increase
in the general sales tax rate. With traditional

vertical equity calculations and a compari-

exemption will provide relief to a poor son between a 5 percent Georgia sales tax

Table 1

Profile of U.S. Food-for-Home-Consumption Spending in 1995
Maximum
Food
Spending
Household Number of Income before Food-for-Home as a Share of
Income Households Taxes Consumption Total Income

$5,000 4693 $1,769 $1,705 0.96
10,000 9827 7,543 1,823 0.24
15,000 8744 12,417 2,208 0.18
20,000 7729 17,342 2,732 0.16
30,000 12658 24,603 2,612 0.11
40,000 10652 34,604 2,907 0.08
50,000 8200 44,409 3,359 0.08
70,000 10375 58,365 3,598 0.06
Unlimited

Source:

U.S.

Department

of

Labor.

Bureau

of

Labor

Statistics.
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rate (with a food exemption) and a 4 percent than 6 percent. Six of the seven, Mississippi being

Georgia sales tax rate (where food remains the exception, give preferential treatment to food
in the tax base), the sales tax with a higher purchases.
rate and a food exemption is no less regressive. This finding does not mean an exemp- Could a Rate Increase Cause a Food Exemption?
tion is bad policy, rather, it is difficult to jus-

tify a food exemption based on the

From the above data, it is likely that the sales
tax rate will be higher in a state with a food ex-

emption. The issue of whether the exemption

regressivity of the general sales tax.

caused the rate increase, however, is more problematic. In fact, a change in the tax rate in North

Carolina was accompanied by relief for food

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE RATES
AND FOOD EXEMPTIONS

purchases. For this tax policy change, the food ex-

emption could be viewed as a political comproFour of the 29 states (and DC) that exempt food
mise in order to gain legislative approval for the
purchases use a partial sales tax rate reduction (Federation of Tax Administrators, 1997). For the rate
16 increase.

states with a sales tax and no preferential treatmentTo investigate the relationship between food

exemptions and state sales tax rates further, we
of food purchases, we find an average state sales

examined the exemption enactment dates (see Due,
tax rate of 4.78 percent on January 1, 1997 (Table

1971; Due and Mikesell, 1983 and 1994; and the
2). For the 29 states with preferential sales tax treat-

U.S. Bureau of the Census). For Indiana, Iowa,
ment of food, we find an average rate of 5.38 perKentucky, and Michigan, representatives from the

cent. A statistical test reveals that these values are

state revenue authority provided the information.
significantly different. Generally, one can expect

Table 3 contains these enactment dates and a brief
to pay a 0.6 percent sales tax premium for the privi-

history of rate changes around those dates. Seven
lege of purchasing food at a lower rate. A higher

of the 13 states did not have a state sales tax rate
tax rate in food-preference states is not a new pheincrease for the ten years prior to the food exempnomenon; Table 2 also includes averages for eartion. Nine states did not have a rate increase within
lier years. We find that the food exemption

five years. Conversely, seven of 12 states raised
"premium" varies between 0.6 in 1997 and 1.1 in
1985.

the sales tax rate within five years of the food ex-

emption date, and eight of 1 1 states raised the rate
State rate differences are emphasized in Figure
within ten years.4
1 , allowing the distribution of rates to be compared
for the two types of states. The distribution of rates For Indiana, Illinois, and West Virginia, the sales
tax rate was remarkably constant before the exis skewed to the low end in non-preference states
emption and increased shortly after. For Iowa and
and toward high rate levels in preference states.
North Carolina, the exemption could be a result of
Currently, seven states have a sales tax rate greater
Table 2

Average State Sales Tax Rates by Food Exemption Status
Selected Years from 1971 to 1997

Number of States Avera8e State Sa,es Tax Rate
where Food is at Least Food is Subject to the Food is at Least
Year

1971

16

3.39

4.01*

1978

18

3.51

4.51*

1981

25

3.49

4.34*

1985

26

3.92

5.02*

1997

*

Denotes

averag

samples).
Note: Excludes the District of Columbia. Alaska, Delaware, Montana, Oregon, and Vermont do not have a state
general sales tax and are also omitted.
Sources: Due and Mikesell (1994) and Federation of Tax Administrators (1997).
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Figure 1: Probability Distribution of Sales Tax Rates July 1, 1997

Source: Federation of Tax Administrators (1997).
the rate increase. Rate increases followed food ex-

appears to support our claim that new food exemptions lead to rate increases, but the difference is
emptions in 64 percent of the states examined, but

one cannot rule out the possibility of reverse caunot statistically significant. However, an interestsality. Therefore, we turn to a time period when
ing question is whether one can conclude that, afsales tax rate increases were common and food

ter holding everything else constant, states with a

exemptions were not enacted; trying to establish
new food exemption (even a partial exemption) in
whether states with new food exemptions were
198 1 were more likely to increase the sales tax rate
more likely to increase the sales tax rate.

over the next four years.

We performed an empirical probability analysis
on data for all states with a general sales tax durin the Early 1980s
ing the early 1980s.6 With a probit model, one can
The recent history of food exemptions is sumtest the hypothesis that the probability of an event
related to other factors. In this case, the model is
marized in Figure 2. Seven states added a rateisreFood Exemptions and Rate Increases

duction between 1978 and 1980, 5 raising the used
totalto examine the effect of a new food exemption on the likelihood of a sales tax rate increase.7
from 19 to 26. The new food exemptions are inter-

esting given the dramatic changes that began
inmodel estimates, reported in Table 5, are disThe
198 1 . A combination of national recession and new
appointing in that none of the coefficients are
fiscal federalism policies under the Reagan admin-

significant. With this model, no systematic deteristration helped produce a significant round of sales minants of these rate increases can be identified.

tax rate increases between 1981 and 1985. During
that period, 26 states plus the District of Columbia

increased the sales tax rate (Due and Mikesell,

CONCLUSION

1983) and five of the seven states with new food

There are some fairly obvious reasons why the
exemptions increased the rate.
food-for-home-consumption exemption from the
Table 4 compares states with new food exemp- general sales tax is popular today. The exemption
tions, established exemptions, and no exemption. benefits nearly every household, it is easily adminIn the first group, the likelihood of a rate increase istered in automated supermarkets, and it responds
450
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Table 3

Sales Tax Rate Changes and Food Exemption Enactment Dates in 13 States
Rate Increase Prior to the Food Rate Increase after the Food

Exemption? State Exemption?
5 to 10 Years Prior Within 5 Years (Exemption Date) Within 5 Years 5 to 10 Years
N

Y

N

Kentucky
N
(1972)

N

Indiana

Y

N
N

(1973)

N

N1

N

Washington

N

N

Y

(1978)

Michigan

N

(1978)

N

Nevada

Y

Y

N
N

(1979)

N

N

Y

West

N

Virginia
(1979)

Arizona

Y

Y

Y

N

(1980)
N

N

Colorado

N2

N

(1980)
N

N

Illinois

Y

Y

(1980)
Y

Y

Nebraska3

Y

Y

(1984)
N

Y

Iowa

N

Y

(1985)
N

Y

North

Carolina

N

N/A

(1992)

Y

N

Georgia

N/A

N/A

3

1

Omits

2
3

a

0.

1

A
Colorado
Nebraska
d

and

enacted

Source:
Census

to

a

one

(various

a

Auth

years).

or
the
til
public
conce

for-hom
endorses
the

sider

the
state a
arguments

next
rece
Common
argume

includeexempt?
the
possib
We have examined the hypothesis
that the food
the
regres

reduce

exemption leads states
to raise the sales tax rate.
some
other
im
We believe the evidence is consistent with
this hyforce
local
gover
The state tax rate data indicate thatgove
states
should pothesis.
local
with a food exemption have a higher rate today,
of
compliance
cos
are

relationship can be observed
over the past
equally and this
by
the

a

25 years. In fact, nearly all of the states with the
competitive
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Figure 2: Total Number of States with Preferential Food Treatment in the Sales Tax
July 1971 through July 1997

Note: Total includes District of Columbia. These data ignore a short increase in the Illinois state sales tax rate (not
accompanied by an increase on food) and a short removal of preferential treatment of food in Louisiana in 1996.

Sources: Due (1971), Due and Mikesell (1983 and 1994), State Tax Notes (1997), Louisiana Department of
Revenue and Taxation (1997), and telephone interviews with state revenue authorities in Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, and Michigan.

highest tax-rates have at least a partial foodFour policy conclusions can be drawn from this
exemption.

study. First, if the sales tax base is narrowed by

Given the relationship between rates and exemp-

providing preferential tax treatment of food, there

tions, as well as the relative popularity of new ex-

is pressure to increase the state sales tax rate. Most

emptions in the late 1970s, we have attempted to
establish whether states with a new food exemption were more likely to increase the sales tax rate

Second, if a food exemption is being considered,

states that exempt food do have higher rates.
analysis should address whether an overall rate re-

between 1981 and 1985. Causality in this rateexemption relationship could not be established.

duction is more desirable in accomplishing the
policy goal. Third, food stamp recipients may be

Numerous states did increase the sales tax in the

hit hardest by a food exemption followed by a rate

early 1980s, but the role of food exemptions canincrease because food stamp purchases cannot be
not be confirmed empirically.
taxed. Finally, if a new food exemption is enacted,
Table 4

Likelihood of a State Sales Tax Increase

by Food Exemption Status, 1981-1985
Number of States with a Share of States with a
Food Exemption Status Total Number of States Sales Tax Increase Sales Taxlncrease

No Food Exemption 20 10 50.0%
Established Food Exemption3 18 9 50.0
New Food Exemptiona b 7 5 7 1 .4

a Totals include states with a partial exemption. The
b New food exemption is defined as enacted between

Source:

Authors'

calculations

based
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Table 5
Probit Results for Determinants of a Sales Tax Rate Increase between 1981 and 1985

(Standard Errors in Parenthesis)
Independent

Variable

Constant

0.1484

-0.2384

(2.2669)

(2.3269)

Established Food Exemption -0.0773 0.0394
(0.4331)

New

Food

Exemption

0.3441

(0.6219)

(0.4499)

0.3941

(0.6418)

Federal Intergovernmental Revenue Reliance 1.0357 1.829
(4.8024)

Income

Tax

Reliance

-2.2111

-2.0237

(2.7525)
Sales

Tax

Reliance

2.0861

Level

-7.45

1

7

(2.8144)
2.1804

(3.9744)
Tax

(4.8557)

(3.9702)

-4.0857

(16.9010) (17.2475)

Share of State Legislators in 1982 that - -0.0024
Belonged to the Democratic Party - (0.0064)
Log-Likelihood

Sample
a
b

-29.38

Size

-28.69

45

44b

None
of
the
coefficients
ar
Legislators
were
elected
wi

3 In Louisiana, a portion
of the preferential
treatcontingencies
for
poten
ment was returned in 1997; in North Carolina,
should
be
established
to
h
the sales tax rate on
grocery purchases remained
ity
of
a
future
sales
tax
ra
at 3 percent when the general state rate increased

to 4 percent in 1992.

Notes

1

The

4 North Carolina and Georgia enacted the food
exemption in 1992
and 1996, respectively. Rate
excess
burden

of

increase
is thereforedependen
incomplete.
todatabe
ity
of
the
5 According
compensated
to the sources mentioned above, the
states with new food-tax reductions
that pos
the
commodities.
It during
is
period were Arizona,
Colorado,
Illinois, Michiinformation
on
price
el
rate
on
a
particular
gan, Nevada, Washington and West Virginia.
(price
6 Due to its unique
fiscal structure, the District
optimal
(see
Tresch,
198

considered

for

an

of Columbia has been omitted from this model.
introduction

literature).

to

7 The dependent variable is whether the sales tax
rate increased between 1981 and 1985. The in-

2 The exemption of many services from the sales

tax base is a slightly different phenomenon in
that services generally were never taxed. Therefore, states have experienced a formal policy

dependent variables are whether the state had a
recent food exemption, whether the state had a

food exemption prior to 1978, general sales tax
revenue as a share of total general revenue in
1981, total state-tax revenue as a share of per-

debate in the case of food and often have not in
the case of services.
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This content downloaded from 131.96.28.155 on Wed, 19 Oct 2022 20:47:49 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS

sonai income (also in 1981), intergovernmental
Fox, William F., and Charles Campbell. "Stability
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